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This paper reports on a particular approach to doing a  
doctorate in which the first author has used personal writing to  
increase the relevance, autonomy and quality of her learning and to  
allow her to present her study, her personal reactions to the study and  
the experiences that have led her to the study in one thesis.  The  
personal writing consisted of reflective and critical journal and  
letter writing through which Mary dealt with the affective, social and  
moral factors she believed to be an integral part of deep learning in a  
social science.  The paper describes how, as well as having  
consequences for her research on improving autonomy, motivation and  
learning in Year 8 science students, this has led her to present her  
PhD thesis on two levels: science education and narrative. 
 
 
The PhD serves two main objectives.  The first is made quite explicit  
 by PhD Handbooks (e.g., QUT, 1993, p. 2): the student researcher is  
 required to produce "an original and substantial contribution to  
 knowledge".  The second, which is less explicit, but which is  
 nevertheless implied in the type of thesis examination required, is to  
 investigate and become proficient in the process of doing research in  
 an ethical manner in one's chosen area (Phillips & Pugh, 1990).  
 
Hence, doing a doctorate is an experience in learning.  As a  
 consequence, therefore, it does not make sense for PhD students in  
 education to ignore recent developments in educational theory when it  
 comes to their own theses.  If what we know about learning processes  
 has undergone evolution, then how learning is represented in reports or  
 representations--such as the PhD thesis--could also be expected to have  
 evolved.  However, in spite of rhetoric about "the social construction  
 of meaning" (Driver, 1988; Tobin, 1993), it has been our experience  
 that it is difficult for doctoral students in science education  
 research to break out of the shackles of traditional experimental  
 notions of research.  Even when qualitative methods are used, we find  
 that a linear program within a single paradigm has been assumed and  
 findings are expected to be "objective".  It is our experience that  
 both subjectivity and discussion of changes in epistemological beliefs  
 are discouraged in doctoral studies.  However, we believe that it is  
 more consistent with recent developments in educational theory for such  
 factors to be accepted and reported as a legitimate part of the  
 learning process in a doctorate. 
 
The traditional model for a thesis in science and science education  
 consists of a literature review leading to the definition of a problem  
 and a plan for investigating it, a pilot study or at least the  
 development and testing of instruments, and the main study, followed by  
 the results, conclusions and discussion.  This is all expected to be in  
 the third person and written as though the knowledge produced is  
 objective, and can be related to a conceptual framework which remains  
 more or less stable from the beginning to the end of the research.   
 
Consequently, any personal account of the research experience is  
 considered at best irrelevant, and at worst, a sign of lack of rigour,  
 and any major changes in epistemological beliefs, rather than being  
 recognised as signs of progress and development, are simply seen as  
 disasters, since they mean that the research will have to be  
 reformulated all over again within the new paradigm, as though the  
 original path taken had been a dead end, lost time.  This position  
 seems to assume that the linear, objective, mono-paradigmatic account  
 is the best model for reporting how the research has been done,  
 regardless of how the learning for the researcher has actually taken  
 place.  It is obviously the standard model for a report of an  
 investigation, or for the testing of a hypothesis, but is it a good  
 model for a report of learning from research in a prolonged study such  
 as a PhD? 
 
One reason for the high rate of attrition in postgraduate research  
 studies may be a clash between students who want their PhD to be  
 personally meaningful and supervisors who resist this approach,  
 favouring the `You have to jump through the traditional hoops to get  
 your PhD, whether they make sense to you or not'.  Since a personally  
 meaningful thesis is more motivating and more self-sustaining, this may  
 also lead to doctorates done with a heavy heart and gritted teeth, and  
 doctorates not even begun, perhaps especially for women. 
 
We would like to suggest that insisting that doctoral students adhere  
 to the traditional report form of representing their research, may in  
 fact reinforce positivistic approaches to learning (including research)  
 the limitations of which have been well recognised in the last few  
 decades.  The traditional scientific model seems, to us, to give an  
 over-simplified picture of how learning happens and what knowledge is,  
 since it presents learning as a more or a less linear, impersonal and  
 individualistic process resulting in knowledge which may be detached  
 from the personal, cultural and historical context of the researcher.   
 
This paper explores these issues in the context of a particular case, a  
 PhD in science education.  It relates how the first author, Mary, found  
 that her experience of the power of personal writing to clarify her  
 ideas, nurture her conceptual development and illuminate her research,  
 was reinforced by her reading of the education literature, where it was  
 argued that rational approaches to conceptual change teaching, which  
 did not allow for affective and social factors, had little impact on  
 the strongly-held naive beliefs that students held about the physical  
 world.  It describes how Mary discovered that at some level all her  
 learning during her research involved personal (including affective)  
 and social (including moral and ethical) factors, and as a result she  
 arrived at the conclusion that, not only did these factors need to be  
 addressed during the research process, but also that their part should  
 be documented in the representation of the research in the PhD thesis.   
 
To do this, the present paper looks at the relationship between the  
 objective and the subjective, between the observed and the observer and  
 between the scientific and the personal, and, in this, the paper itself  




The Scientific Method 
 
In my case, I naively assumed that producing new knowledge would be the  
 hard part and that the methodology would be simply a matter of adopting  
 and following a set of procedures already available in the literature.   
 Similarly the question of ethics seemed to present no problem, as I had  
 no intention of cheating or harming anyone.  The further I have gone in  
 this PhD process, however, the more I realise that the construction of  
 knowledge, the methodology used, and ethical considerations are all  
 intimately connected.  The PhD has become a journey for me, a search  
 for the research methodology which is capable of allowing me to  
 participate fruitfully in the construction of new knowledge in the  
 
 field of education in a way which is just and equitable to other  
 participants.  
 
Consequently, I wish to argue that the fact that so far I have  
 seriously adopted, questioned and distanced myself from various  
 distinct schools of thought, should not be seen as a sign of fickleness  
 and superficiality on my part, but rather as progress along a dimension  
 of awareness of what knowledge is, how meaning is constructed by  
 humans, and what diverse purposes research can serve.  In so doing, I  
 could be said to be aiming to fulfil a third objective of the PhD,  
 again rarely made explicit but which is represented by the "Ph" in that  
 designation - to raise questions about the meaning of the knowledge  
 being produced or constructed.   Because I see the PhD in these terms,  
 I see my own task of making "an original and substantial contribution  
 to knowledge" as being a larger process than that of doing and  
 reporting some linear process of empirical research, from a supposedly  
 objective or, at least stable, viewpoint.  For me the research is much  
 more of a hermeneutic process, with its meaning being rewritten many  
 times along the way, as the whole is continually being reconceptualised  
 in the light of new learning. 
 
For these reasons, it is being proposed that the research will be  
 reported at two interconnected levels, one level reporting the separate  
 research project activities and their outcomes as they are experienced  
 with the co-participants--the science education research, and the other  
 level reporting the reflexive process of analysing the research process  
 itself--the narrative inquiry.  Since the overall process is a process  
 of change over time, the research as a whole is most easily conceived  
 of as the development of a narrative (Connelly & Clandinin, 1990), a  
 jointly-developed narrative, with many participants, but told by one  
 narrator who takes responsibility for, and at the same time critiques,  
 the view of intersubjective reality presented, at each stage and as a  
 whole.  
 
There are many parallels between the two levels of study, since in fact  
 they both focus on deep learning (or conceptual change), on the  
 relationship between doing activities and learning, on the importance  
 of reflection in learning, on the place of affect and values in  
 learning, and hence of the impact on learning of the psychosocial  
 learning environment, including the broader cultural setting.   
 Furthermore they both explore ways of deepening and broadening  
 learning, particularly using collaborative groups and reflective  
 writing.  In both cases it is argued that deep learning is not a  
 rational, linear process, devoid of emotional content, but rather that  
 learning is a recursive and personal process, in which knowledge is  
 reshaped, broadened and deepened, and in which prior knowledge is  
 questioned and reconceptualised, so that it becomes more intelligible,  
 plausible and fruitful. 
 
Is the traditional model of a thesis how scientists, whether in the  
 natural or social sciences, usually develop theories that advance  
 thinking in their particular areas of knowledge, or is their research  
 process at once more iterative and developmental, more personal and  
 creative, and generally more collaborative and political?  There is  
 support for a more flexible approach to research in the social  
 sciences.  For instance, Stenhouse (1980, p. 244), arguing for action  
 research as the most appropriate methodology for research in education,  
 commented, 
 
 "Progress in human affairs is not like progress in physical sciences:  
as we begin to see the lines on which to design a strategy for solving  
the puzzle, the puzzle itself is changed." 
 
As in Stenhouse's comment, this alternative direction for social  
 science usually involves differentiating social science research from  
 physical science research, but are they really so different?  There is 
 evidence that producing new knowledge in the physical and natural  
 sciences can be a creative and collaborative enterprise, and one in  
 which language is developed at the same time as new theories are being  
 created.  Kekule is well-known for his creativity in deducing a ring  
 model for the benzine molecule from a dream he had about snakes who  
 turned around to grasp their own tails, but he is less well-known for  
 setting up a meeting of European scientists to work out a common system  
 for naming or symbolising the chemicals that were being documented.   
 Another scientist and a father of modern chemistry, Michael Faraday,  
 wrote,  
 
"You can hardly imagine how I am struggling to exert my poetical ideas  
 just now for the discovery of analogies and remote figures respecting  
 the earth, sun, and all sorts of things--for I think that is the true  
 way (corrected by judgment) to work out a discovery" (in a letter to C.  
 F. Schoenbein in 1845, cited in Sutton, 1992, frontispiece).   
 
If knowledge in science advances in these complex ways, is there much  
 point in continuing to insist on representing research as a simple  




Two Levels of Research 
 
As my research progressed, it became increasingly difficult for me not  
 to apply the implications of my developing theories about conceptual  
 change, to my own learning and reporting process as a fledgling  
 researcher.  This began while I was studying the importance of  
 metacognition to expert learning, and with a conviction that I had to  
 be metacognitive about my own learning processes and goals, including  
 emotional components which may have been affecting learning.  Later,  
 after being exposed to ideas about the sociocultural nature of  
 learning, I also became convinced about the importance of acknowledging  
 the part played in learning by sociocultural factors such as beliefs  
 (particularly motivational beliefs), values and attitudes. 
 
As I read more of the literature coming from an interpretivist (e.g.,  
 Erickson, 1986), constructivist (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Bruner,  
 1990) or interactional sociolinguistic perspective (e.g., Collins &  
 Green, 1992), and became more convinced of the cultural embeddedness of  
 language (and therefore of knowledge conveyed as language), I saw my  
 individual production of knowledge as being necessarily shaped by my  
 personal place in my own cultural context.  This seemed a natural  
 extension of the notion that knowledge is context-dependent, and thus  
 should be reported in relation to that context (with myself being part  
 of the context).  Consequently I saw a need to openly report relevant  
 aspects of my personal context, such as my beliefs, values, biases, and  
 agenda.  This is supported by Walkerdine's (1994, AARE keynote address)  
 argument that since subjectivity in social research is "impossible to  
 avoid", the researcher should decide "how to use it as a feature of the  
 research project itself." She argued that "the way that I'd been  
 brought up to see the world, my very subjectivity, created,  
 produced...the social world itself" and hence necessitated "[taking]  
 seriously the position from which I thought, felt, observed and wrote." 
 
My belief in the necessity of revealing the subjective aspects of my  
 development of knowledge was reinforced by the influence of critical  
 social science theory, particularly critical educational science theory  
 as proposed by Kemmis and his colleagues (e.g., Carr & Kemmis, 1986),  
 since it advocated the bringing to consciousness and critical  
 examination of implicit theories, through (collaborative) critical  
 action research, in order to find inconsistencies and or  
 contradictions, sometimes referred to as `false consciousness.' 
 
Consequently, as I began to apply my theory of learning to my own  
 research process, as I began to see myself as part of the context of  
 knowledge construction, and as I began to adopt a critical,  
 self-reflexive stance in relation to my research, narrative began to  
 seem eminently suitable as a way of reporting my research process or  
 journey.  For me, the search for a research method which was congruent  
 with my intellectual and ethical beliefs, was as important as finding a  
 topic worthy of investigation.  Narrative inquiry, since it allowed for  
 change, even including radical change, during the research process,  
 also allowed me to maintain my integrity in how I went about doing and  
 reporting my research.  It freed me from the traditional constraint of  
 reporting the research as though it all belonged within a single  
 paradigmatic structure, and was reported by a single voice.  A  
 narrative inquiry research design could incorporate change as an  
 integral and even necessary part of the process of constructing  
 knowledge.  It also seemed to me to represent a truer model of how most  
 complex knowledge is constructed than the neater,  
 `theory-practice-conclusions,' linear model suggests. 
 
For me this was particularly significant because my philosophical and  
 methodological commitments underwent changes several times during my  
 research, each change necessitating a new research plan.  Thus, for the  
 first three studies I undertook, although they did not become the main  
 study or lead directly to it, nevertheless they provided me with a  
 deeper level of knowledge for reflection on the particular research  
 problem I had chosen, on the purpose of research and on the most  
 suitable methodology for satisfying my research aims.  Not including  
 them on the grounds that they were `false starts' or `dead ends', seems  
 to me to imply a model of learning which ignores the importance of  
 prior relevant learning to further learning. 
 
In an attempt to both study students' learning of science and reflect  
 on her role in the PhD, Mary divided the aims and objectives of her PhD  
 into two parallel and interdependent sets: the science education aims  
 and objectives which refer to the classroom research (this is what Mary  
 originally thought would be the whole of her research); and the  
 narrative or metalevel aims and objectives, which refer to her personal  
 context as she experienced and interpreted the entire research process.  
   
The science education aims were to explore the effects of the  
 psychosocial learning environment on student engagement for conceptual  
 change in science classes, and to search for approaches, based on peer  
 learning and personal writing, of facilitating the type of environment  
 thought most likely to be promote scientific literacy.  More  
 specifically, this research had the following objectives:   
(1)to investigate in depth at least one secondary level science class,  
in terms of factors related to the quality of students' cognitive  
engagement for conceptual change; 
(2)to develop, using the findings above and an analysis of her findings  
in the literature, a model of the science classroom as a learning  
environment which could enhance conceptual change; 
(3) to partially explore the soundness of the model referred to in (2),  
by examining the relationship between factors, as defined by the model,  
and as operationalised in a learning environment questionnaire designed  
for a specific science class; and  
(4) to explore the soundness of the model for understanding cases of  
daily practice, and, by collaborating with several teachers and their  
students in secondary science classrooms, to find ways of realising it,  
for example, by including personal writing and peer learning in regular  
classroom activities. 
The narrative aims were to make explicit the journey of the researcher  
 involved in making "an original and substantial contribution to  
 knowledge" (QUT, 1993, p. 2). In this context, the metalevel objectives  
 of this research which were formerly implicit now became explicit: 
(5) to search for a rational and just method of doing research in  
science education, through reading of the available literature, through  
discussion with other research participants, and other members of the  
educational research community, and through reflective journal writing; 
(6)to critically evaluate both her practice as an educational  
researcher and also the quality of her contribution to the construction  
of knowledge through the research process; and  
(7)to report on this process of critical appraisal of both her research  
practice and of the value of the knowledge contributed, in the form of  
a self-reflexive narrative. 
 
For us, reporting the personal context, that is, reporting on the  
 historical events and philosophical outlook which framed the science  
 education research project, is essential for a coherent reading of how  
 and why the research was done and came to the stated conclusions.   
 Reporting the whole process also has the advantage of being a truer  
 account of the process than is possible when only the final  
 "successful" outcomes of research are reported. 
 
Mary developed a three stage research design for the two levels of  
 objectives.  Stage 1 covered exploratory studies in which Mary trialled  
 different approaches to research,  There were three exploratory  
 studies: a first participant observational study of a secondary science  
 class in which participation was minimal, a survey study of a larger  
 number of science students to investigate the relationship between  
 variables of interest, and a second, more collaborative participant  
 observational study in another secondary science class.  The three  
 exploratory studies were encompassed in the narrative inquiry out of  
 which they grew and in relation to which they take their meaning.  The  
 narrative inquiry had three main themes: the development of knowledge  
 about science learning in classrooms, the development of understanding  
 of the practical and ethical implications of different methods of doing  
 research, and the development of understanding of what it means to  
 produce new knowledge.  Part of the first narrative inquiry  
 theme--developing knowledge about science learning in classrooms - took  
 the form of model-building which continued throughout most of the  
 period of the three exploratory studies.  The process consists of  
 synthesising findings, which included those gained by revisiting the  
 literature, into a new theory of science learning.  This is similar to  
 the first part of a `Phase 2 project' as explained by Woods (1985) and  
 results in another kind of grounded theory - theory which is grounded  
 in an analysis of previous research.  The previous research analysed  
 can be from a variety of perpectives and may be cross-disciplinary.   
 The resultant theory is then further tested in ongoing research  
 studies.  
 
Stage 2 was the final classroom study, whose methodology would be based  
 on conclusions reached at the end of Stage 1 about the most ethical and  
 useful way of doing research on science education, and would be framed  
 as the process of facilitating an extended action research study or two  
 or three smaller action research studies by science teacher  
 practitioners concerned with how the classroom environment could  
 facilitate learning in science.  As such, this would necessitate  
 critical self-reflection about her role as a facilitator, so that the  
 two levels of investigation would merge into a single analysis of her  
 practice as a facilitator, including an evaluation of this as a method  
 of researching her science education objectives. 
 
In Stage 3, Mary would draw together reflections on all three themes.   
 This process would be one of updating theory about learning in science  
 classrooms, synthesising findings about the practical and ethical  
 considerations of doing collaborative research with  
 teacher-practitioners, and, finally, developing understanding of what  
 it meant to produce new knowledge as a PhD student studying science  





At the beginning of my PhD, I thought that writing a reflective journal  
 would help me to learn more deeply.  I had used it in a professional  
 development course on adult literacy teaching and had found that it  
 allowed me to draw more useful conclusions from the readings and  
 lectures than I otherwise would have.  It also helped me to integrate  
 my new learning with my practical experience in the classroom, in a way  
 which was exciting and challenging and opened up new avenues to my own  
 professional development.  Before I began my PhD, a prospective  
 supervisor suggested I keep a reading journal.  At that stage it was  
 simply a means of reflecting on my readings, but it soon started to  
 evolve and to serve more functions and eventually became the framework  
 through which I was able to make sense of my research and of the  
 research process itself. 
 
Prior to the PhD, my research experiences, two literature review  
 subjects and two research subjects, had showed me that my feelings, as  
 long as they were unresolved, could seriously interfere with my  
 analytical processes.  And this was compounded by the fact that what I  
 chose to research was inevitably something about which I felt strongly  
 but which still presented me with problems.  Before I could analyse the  
 data I was dealing with in a insightful, unclouded manner, I had to  
 sort out irrational feelings such as shame, doubt, inadequacy, anger,  
 fear, adulation or pride, that might otherwise absorb half my  
 concentration whenever I started reading or thinking about my  
 subject-matter. 
 
I dealt with my mixed feelings partly by reading.  I read anything and  
 everything that might throw light on why I felt the way I did and  
 explain why I had turned out the way I did.  This reading phase helped  
 me to feel better about myself and let me give all my attention to the  
 more generally interesting questions that the literature seemed to  
 throw up. 
 
When it came to the writing phase, I needed a second period of dealing  
 with my attitudes to separate out the rational from the less rational.   
 I found that I needed to do a first writing in which I let out all my  
 heartfelt conclusions about the topic: heated criticisms of what seemed  
 to me unreasonable arguments or inadequate research, elaborations of  
 what the conclusions might mean, enthusiasms for particular ideas and  
 arguments, and admissions of where there were gaps in my own arguments.  
  This was never intended to be seen by any eye other than mine, and  
 would not have worked if I had been censoring it in any way at all.   
 Once I had expressed this multitude of ideas which had been clamouring  
 for a hearing, I could see what I really had there on paper before me,  
 what the main issues were, and what the evidence for and against them  
 was worth.  I could see the hyperbole in my writing for what it  
 was--usually an attempt to compensate for arguments which were not  
 strong enough on their own.  But it was also in this stage that I was  
 most creative and insightful and saw new relationships which had not  
 been apparent to me before.  I do not believe I would have had these  
 insights if I had tried to be perfectly objective and had repressed  
 anything with emotional content. 
 
Writing the research report then became relatively straight-forward.   
 What the main question was and how the writing should be structured  
 seemed to become clear.  Somehow, having had the chance to express my  
 own personal concerns and values allowed me to see more clearly just  
 what were personal concerns and what was more generally important about  
 the findings of my study.  My reports were not uniformly  
 insightful--there were often still parts that I had not thought through  
 clearly enough, but I know that overall the reports were much more  
 penetrating than they would have been if I had tried to ignore the  
 emotional content that for me was associated with the subject matter. 
 
Before I began my PhD, however, I did not consciously go through this 
 process.  It was only after I had been through it several times that I  
 began to see a pattern in my way of dealing with difficult learning  
 projects.  And it was only after active experience with explicit  
 journal-writing activities, and after meeting the concept of  
 metacognition, that the pattern started to become more apparent and  
 meaningful, and it was not until well into my PhD--when my  
 journal-writing method of clarifying my ideas was being questioned by a  
 previous supervisor, that I realised the importance of the personal  
 writing stages in my overall research process.   
 
As well as being a personally meaningful research methodology,  
 narrative, which has always played an important part in social science  
 more generally, has also recently begun to play a growing role in  
 research in education, and more recently still, to play a part in  
 research in science education.  The narrative inquiry research method  
 enables the accommodation of an ethical concern, one shared with  
 critical educational theorists such as Carr and Kemmis (1986), a  
 concern about the relationship between theory and practice, or, more  
 positively, a concern for an equitable relationship between researchers  
 and practitioners.  According to Connelly and Clandinin (1990, p. 12),  
[W]hat is at stake is less a matter of working theories and ideologies  
 and more a question of the place of research in the improvement of  
 practice and of how researchers and practitioners may productively  
 relate to one another....Our own work then becomes one of learning to  
 tell and live a new mutually constructed account of inquiry in teaching  
 and learning.  What emerges from this mutual relationship are new  
 stories of teachers and learners as curriculum makers, stories that  
 hold new possibilities for both researchers and teachers and for those  
 who read their stories. 
 
Narrative inquiry appears to be able to offer the chance to bridge the  
 divide between researchers and practitioners by allowing practitioners  
 a voice in the construction of new knowledge in the form of the jointly  
 constructed narrative.  
 
That narrative inquiry has the potential to result in such a narrative  
 which provides a more accessible and compelling record of the shared  
 research to other practitioners than a purely discursive account, is a  
 further advantage.  According to Connelly and Clandinin (1990, p.10),  
 "the principal attraction of narrative as method is its capacity to  
 render life experiences, both personal and social, in relevant and  
 meaningful ways." 
 
Journal Writing and Changing Alternative Conceptions in Science 
For my PhD, I began with two separate files, one for reflections on  
 where I was going with my PhD, and one for comments on my readings  
 which, coincidentally, were at this stage focused on ideas about  
 metacognition and its role in deep learning.  I was challenged by the  
 idea put forward by Paris and Winograd (1990), that metacognitive  
 practices, since they were associated with evaluation of one's own  
 processes inevitably provoked feelings such as pride, happiness, shame  
 or despair, which could then affect motivation and learning.  I was  
 also impressed by a review of studies in reattribution training for  
 discouraged learners by Borkowski, Carr, Rellinger, and Pressley  
 (1990), who concluded that three factors were interdependent in their  
 affect on the emergence of self-regulated learning: metacognition,  
 motivational, and personality constructs.  This reinforced what I had  
 learnt in psychology from cognitive behavioural therapists such as  
 Aaron Beck, who showed how automatic everyday thoughts could be  
 irrational and affect one's motivational beliefs, and how this could be  
 combated by bringing out the hidden thoughts for a rational analysis.   
 I became convinced that learning could not fail to be enhanced when  
 learners paid critical attention to their everyday thoughts and 
 feelings about their research. 
 
Being metacognitive as defined by such writers meant not only thinking  
 about one's subject-matter, but also thinking about one's own thinking  
 process and taking control of it.  I realised it would make better  
 sense if I combined my personal journal and my annotated bibliography  
 and did not keep my thinking about my research question separate from  
 my thinking about my learning processes.  I also started to include  
 other thinking about my research in it, for example, a long letter to  
 my original supervisor about my concerns that we were not likely to be  
 compatible, and a poem I wrote in protest when he dismissed Piaget as  
 being out of date, and told me not to bother reading any of his  
 writing.  My journal soon became a place for me to explore my feelings  
 about what was going on in the PhD process, at the same time as  
 exploring the validity of the research and theories I was developing. 
 
At the beginning it was a very private diary, a conversation with  
 myself, but as time progressed, it became a place for me to dialogue  
 with or about absent theorists and sometimes such writing developed  
 into letters to distant academics who seemed willing to act as mentors  
 to me for a period of time.  What this meant was that the  
 self-criticism contained in my journal-writing at the beginning was of  
 a confessional nature, a private examination of my conscience to see if  
 I was being intellectually honest, and much of my argument could remain  
 implicit.  As time went by, and my imagined audience expanded to take  
 in people who might not accept my reasoning as easily as I myself  
 would, my self-criticism became more socially based, and I had to make  
 my arguments more explicit, with the result that I became increasingly  
 aware of both my own assumptions and also those of others involved in  
 the dialogue.  I started to see the social and ethical issues involved  
 in research and to take a more critical view of the practice of  
 research in my own and other institutions. 
 
However other ways of  understanding what it means to create or refine  
 knowledge are common.  Besides being found in other education research  
 circles, new epistemologies are, in fact, exemplified in some science  
 education research writings and are to be found incorporated in current  
 theories of science pedagogy, such as social constructivism.  In spite  
 of this fact, the implications of such epistemological beliefs for PhD  
 study are still largely unexplored in the field of science education.  
 
Reading in the science education research literature indicated that  
 what were initially called `misconceptions' loomed large as a problem  
 area.  It seemed that students were learning the accepted scientific  
 theories in the classroom and could use them to solve standard  
 classroom problems and pass tests, but that when they were put to the  
 test in a problem-solving situation in a different context, they  
 reverted to na‹ve theories which they had somehow preserved intact  
 alongside their school learning (Osborne & Freyberg, 1985; Posner,  
 Strike, Hewson & Gertzog, 1982; White & Gunstone, 1989).   
 
Researchers had tried to solve this problem of the persistence of  
 `alternative beliefs', as they were later renamed, but such beliefs  
 seemed amazingly resistant to change.  Various pedagogies were proposed  
 to challenge the alternative beliefs.  For example the PEEL project  
 grew out of research in science teaching and learning which  
 demonstrated that teachers could help students to learn in a more  
 meaningful way by giving them metacognitive strategies to use, the type  
 of strategies that successful students used (Baird, 1986; Baird &  
 Northfield, 1992).  However, students quickly found ways of using  
 metacognitive strategies without being metacognitive, and it seemed  
 that the problem of superficial learning was far from being solved  
 (White & Baird, 1991).  Paris and Winograd's caution that one could not  
 get students to evaluate their own learning, self-evaluation being an  
 integral part of metacognition, without raising emotional responses,  
 including negative ones which could lead to negative attributions and 
 decreased engagement in learning.  The cognitive science approach often  
 seemed to me to lack strategies and theories to deal with the emotional  
 and volitional components of learning.  The expert-novice literature,  
 however, seemed to me to suggest it was the will to learn and attain  
 deep understanding in a particular domain that lead to the use of  
 metacognitive strategies, rather than the reverse (Jones & Idol, 1990).  
  Other approaches to the conceptual change problem were based in a  
 social constructivist epistemology (Driver, 1988), and relied on  
 enculturation by small group learning to challenge individual na‹ve  
 conceptions, with the social context providing the motivational impetus  
 for learning. 
 
The problem seemed to me to become one of motivating students to be  
 intrinsically interested in learning, which would not be an easy task  
 since it would mean first overcoming negative beliefs which students  
 had about themselves as learners, about learning and about their  
 subject matter.  However, Mary believed that students could be given  
 back their faith in themselves as learners, their delight in learning,  
 and their enjoyment of science learning, and the more she read the more  
 convinced she became.  Collins, Brown & Newman's (1989) `cognitive  
 apprenticeship' model, demonstrated, using illustrations from three  
 successful methods of teaching, that learning could be successful for  
 all learners if it provided a social context which reinforced positive  
 motivational beliefs, and treated every individual's learning as  
 socially valuable.  Pintrich, Marx, and Boyle (1993) also argued that  
 the sociological context was vital to the motivational beliefs  
 necessary for cognitive engagement, and pointed out their likely  
 importance to conceptual change teaching in science.  Watts and Bentley  
 (1987) gave support to such arguments by emphasising the need for a  
 non-threatening learning environment if students were to expose and  
 investigate their prior learning in science as part of conceptual  
 change learning. 
 
One strategy which teachers could use to give students messages to  
 encourage positive motivational beliefs and provide a safe environment  
 for the deconstruction of old scientific beliefs and accommodation of  
 new learning is collaborative group work.  However, small group work  
 can be difficult for some individuals unless there is a large amount of  
 support which may not be available.  Therefore, the strategy learnt in  
 the professional development course in adult literacy education was  
 chosen: personal or journal writing.  In her experience of teaching  
 literacy to adult learners Mary had found that a warmly encouraging and  
 non-judgmental environment could work wonders with students with weak  
 self-efficacy beliefs, and journal writing, used appropriately,  
 appeared to have the potential to provide such an environment. 
 
Reflections and Conclusions 
 
My initial proposal was for an intervention study using role allocation  
 in small groups and metacognitive strategies to help students learn  
 from their practical investigations in science, and it was to include  
 allowing students to be metacognitive about their motivational beliefs  
 as well as about their other learning processes.  It included pre- and  
 post-tests, with some qualitative data being thrown in to reinforce and  
 explain my objective findings, a typical positivist approach to  
 research. 
 
Unfortunately for my plans for a short PhD but fortunately for my  
 continued development, I was introduced to, and converted to  
 `interpretive' research and offered a chance to undertake a classroom  
 study with a focus on the learning environment by a visiting scholar.   
 Coming from a very objectivist stance, I initially found such research  
 very difficult as the data seemed so nebulous, but gradually I came to  
 see that such research allowed a more sophisticated insight into  
 learning through classroom research than my previous positivistic  
 approach, which began to seem more and more inappropriate for research 
 in social situations where so many variables were interacting.  The  
 context, or rather how it was interpreted by the participants in it,  
 and how this developed as a mini-culture over time, could no longer be  
 ignored as mere `noise' in my data.  Such factors became, in fact a  
 prime source of data.  My conception of the importance of context in  
 research also deepened with my reading of Bruner (1990), which  
 convinced me that meaning making was a personal and social experience  
 and depended on cultural narratives for much of its sense.  
 
So I gave up my idea of an intervention and set to reading Erickson  
 (1986) and Guba and Lincoln (1989), observing in a classroom setting,  
 and doing interviews.  My discomfort with being an interpreter of the  
 learning environment evaporated but a new one came in its place.  There  
 seemed to me to be something patronising about researchers coming in  
 with preconceptions and theories of their own, through which filter  
 they interpreted the culture, and then went  away and reported the  
 `participants' view of the learning environment'.  I could not believe  
 that the participants (teachers and students in schools) were in an  
 equitable enough position of power to control the interview situation  
 so that their particular viewpoint was adequately represented or to  
 properly critique a script given to them for member checking by  
 researchers with `Dr' or `Professor' in front of their name.  I was  
 also unhappy with ethnographic research because I could not see how it  
 would lead to change in schools, unless it could involve the members of  
 the school community more actively in decision-making and  
 problem-solving about the interpretation of the problems and the  
 finding of solutions to them.  Such restraints led to indecision on my  
 part, dissatisfaction with my progress by others, and a hold-up in my  
 research proposal.  
 
This was only resolved when I decided to let that research project go  
 and to plan a new one which would involve research of a much more  
 collaborative and problem-solving nature, and action research then  
 presented itself as a near perfect solution for me, not only because it  
 was geared towards change, or because it involved the participants of  
 the research itself in the decision-making process, but because it also  
 addressed issues such as power inequities, and seemed to allow for more  
 critical reflectivity than the previous research methodologies I had  
 tried.  I had not lost sight of my `research problem' though I had had  
 to pretend to have when I went into the ethnographic research with a  
 supposedly open mind.  I still wanted to find a way of using personal  
 writing in science to help students overcome barriers to learning with  
 deep understanding.  So I set about finding a teacher or group of  
 teachers with similar concerns and interests to collaborate with me in  
 research, and continued writing up my still incomplete research  
 proposal. 
 
There was one other study which I will not go into since it mainly  
 served as my last point of resistance before I would let go my ties  
 with the secure world of statistical analysis and venture out in the  
 world of qualitative analysis.  This was a questionnaire study  
 involving over 100 students, using a questionnaire I wrote based on a  
 model of a possible conceptual change learning environment that I had  
 been developing during my first classroom study.  The results seemed to  
 support my theory, with highly statistically significant results, but  
 it became even more obvious to me that such quantitative studies could  
 not explain findings, and hence were not very useful as a guide for  
 pedagogical changes for more effective learning. 
 
At this stage I found that philosophically there was a widening gap  
 between me and some of the people I had been working with, who had  
 little sympathy for my belief in the power of personal writing in a  
 non-threatening learning environment, who saw my desire to empower  
 teachers and students as somewhat foolish, and who had little  
 understanding of the importance to me of my own subjective  
 journal-writing as a method of clarifying ideas and moving forward in 
 my research.  I felt very unsupported in what to me were very important  
 issues, and realised that I would never come up with a proposal that  
 would be highly acceptable to them.  
 
Back to Square 1?  No, not at all.  I believed that I had made much  
 more progress in my knowledge about research and learning in my  
 research so far than if I had gone ahead with my initial proposal,  
 without questioning the paradigm, or thinking about issues of  
 subjectivity, and of ethics in dealings with other members of the  
 research community.  I started to see the bits and pieces that had made  
 up the previous two years as being highly significant learning  
 experiences which would have just as much influence on my final  
 conclusions as would the final study I planned to do.  I decided that  
 as such they should be a legitimate part of my research plan, and I  
 started to see the falsity for me of pretending that I was doing a  
 single study, with perhaps one of my earlier studies being smuggled in  
 as a pilot study.  I also  began to see the need to give a more  
 personally reflective account of my research.  If it were true that a  
 knowledge of the context, as it is perceived by actors in a situation,  
 is crucial to the interpretation of the actions which take place in  
 that situation, then, for readers of my research, my personal  
 characteristics and beliefs, and my history, could not be ignored as  
 mere `noise'.  If I myself were to be the `instrument of research'  
 (Guba & Lincoln, 1989), then the results of my research would be  
 influenced by my philosophies and biases, based in turn on my personal  
 and cultural background.  This led to my decision to include such  
 personal factors in the account of my research to the extent that I  
 perceived them to be relevant to my interpretation of what I was  
 observing.  But not only should such personal factors be included in  
 the final account of the research, to allow the reader to decide for  
 him or herself how they had influenced the findings, but also, as  
 Valerie Walkerdine argued in her address to AARE last year, they should  
 be included in one's ongoing analysis of the research, so that the  
 researcher herself could achieve some insight into their influence  
 while the research was still in progress. 
 
As far as we can generalise from Mary's case, her use of journal  
 writing has promoted deep learning and a questioning, critical attitude  
 that led to both personal and intellectual growth, and professional  
 development in her practice as a researcher.  Because it related her  
 learning to personal issues, it also promoted a high degree of  
 commitment to the research process, and gave her the necessary  
 motivation to bear the frustrations and to respond to the many  
 challenges which doctoral study almost inevitably provides.   
 
She also found that the results were similar when Year 8 students used  
 journal writing in a science class.  Allowing students in one class to  
 have their personal reactions to learning accepted as real and  
 meaningful, seemed to reduce the resistance to learning that nearly all  
 their other teachers reported.  This supports the view that a good  
 environment for learning is one in which the students feels affirmed  
 and free to participate personally in the construction of their own  
 learning (Watts & Bentley, 1987). 
 
It appears that using journal writing can be a very rewarding  
 experience, and an excellent method for students to make sense of their  
 research and of the PhD process which can otherwise be a very  
 frustrating process.  It helps clarify ideas and discover new leads,  
 and can increase creativity by allowing connections to be made and  
 transfer to take place between information usually stored in  
 disconnected compartments of the brain.  It helps discover  
 inconsistencies in thinking, forces one to be more intellectually  
 honest and to confront a wider range of issues than are otherwise  
 likely to be confronted, including moral and political issues, and  
 makes one more critically aware.  It helps overcome motivational  
 problems, sustains the writer through periods when no-one else seems to  
 want to hear, gives strength of convictions in the face of opposition,  
 and makes the learning experience all worthwhile.  This is regardless  
 of whether the PhD is finished or not, although finishing is now more  
 likely as the writer has so much personal investment in it.  Finally it  
 makes the writing phase much easier, since when it comes to formal  
 writing, the issues have already been threshed in advance, and  
 emotional baggage has already been removed, leaving only the pure  
 grain.  
 
I can usually justify what I believe in a scholarly manner by the time  
 I've finished tussling with it, and a personal bibliographic base of  
 more than eight hundred entries, complete (well, not all of them) with  
 quotes and summaries helps me to do this, not to mention hundreds of  
 pages of personal reflection. 
 
As well, I'm moving more and more towards including myself as part of  
 the research context and to acknowledge my findings--in spite of my  
 efforts to socially validate them--as being my interpretation based on  
 my meaning-making--given my background--rather than as objective   
 findings in any sense.  To be convincing about my findings then, I   
 will need as much to communicate my own personal experience of the  
 research effectively, as to demonstrate such qualities as credibility   
 and trustworthiness.  Most people I talk to (I wrote `most men' but   
 then changed it) see this point of view as self-indulgent--especially   
 if they come from a science background, and particularly if they have  
 had a traditional academic career, but other researchers, such as  
 Valerie Walkerdine, argue that subjectivity is unavoidable and so  must  
 be presented as part of the research, in an attempt to evaluate its  
 part in the process, or at least acknowledge it to the reader who can  
 then judge its part in the process.  Trying to avoid admitting one's  
 own biases and assumptions in doing the analysis (and, before that, in  
 framing the data on which it is based), seems to me to be hiding  
 something from the reader which is important to the meaning-making  
 process that the reader is trying to make sense of....  
 
Re my proposal, K has a copy of it if you're interested in reading it.   
 His response seemed to be `Aye, it's delicious [read `scholarly and  
 well argued'], but that's NO' HOW YOU MAKE PORRIDGE! [do a PhD in  
 science education]'.  I'm afraid that I have to make porridge the way  
 which makes most sense to me in 1995, and I can only wish the science  
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